

# CMPT 880 Special Topics:

## Program Analysis & Reliability

Nick Sumner - Spring 2014

Much adapted from Xiangyu Zhang, Antony Hosking, Sorin Lerner,  
Jonathan Aldrich, Sam Blackshear

# Today

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- Administtrivia
- Dive right in!
  - Overview
  - Program Representations
  - Slicing
  - Basic Static Analysis
  - LLVM Basics

Time permitting

# Course Website


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- [www.cs.sfu.ca/~wsumner/teaching/880-13/](http://www.cs.sfu.ca/~wsumner/teaching/880-13/)
  - Schedule
  - Policies
  - Assignments
  - Paper Suggestions

# Why are you here?

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
- Programs are big, complex, and difficult to reason about.



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
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


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What is the cause of a bug?

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
Are there more efficient designs?

What is the cause of a bug?

How do I find new bugs?

# Why are you here?

- Programs are big, complex, and difficult to reason about.



Are there more efficient designs?

What is the cause of a bug?

How do I find new bugs?

How do I find security vulnerabilities?  
Can I protect against them?



# Why are you here?

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- Programs are big, complex, and difficult to reason about.
  - Billions in lost profits and savings
  - Human casualties
  - Very tired grad students

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- Programs are big, complex, and difficult to reason about.
  - Billions in lost profits and savings
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People are bad at tedious, subtle tasks,  
but computers are great at them!

# Goal

---

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      - Profiling
- (Speed, Potential Concurrency, Memory, ...)

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  - Survey of *program analysis* techniques & papers
    - Profiling
    - Testing

More effective tests. Bridge testing & verification

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    - Profiling
    - Testing
    - Debugging
      - Explaining or locating the causes of bugs

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  - Survey of *program analysis* techniques & papers
    - Profiling
    - Testing
    - Debugging
    - Concurrency

How to explain race conditions?

Atomicity violations?

How to find 'Heisenbugs'?



# Goal

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- Learn how difficult tasks in development can be pushed onto computers.
  - Survey of *program analysis* techniques & papers
    - Profiling
    - Testing
    - Debugging
    - Concurrency
    - Security

How to find vulnerabilities before attackers.

(...or as attackers)

# Structure

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- First few weeks (2-3) are review & background
  - I present.
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- Reading foundational & new papers
  - 2 student presentations & paper discussions per week
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- 2 small projects to introduce LLVM
- Course projects presented at end.

# Presentations

---

- Guidelines on website
- 2 Goals
  - Help reinforce the material for the class
  - Lead an interesting discussion to examine the trade offs of each technique. (I'll be helping.)

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- 2 Goals
  - Help reinforce the material for the class
  - Lead an interesting discussion to examine the trade offs of each technique. (I'll be helping.)
- Show how the technique behaves in the best case
- Show or lead discussion on where it might behave poorly

# Critiques

---

- Guidelines on website
- 1-2 page response to 1 paper each week that you do not present.
- Primarily meant to prepare you for the discussion on the paper that week.

# Term Projects

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- Groups of 1 or 2.
- 1 page proposals due March 3.
- Find something that interests (or irritates) you and go after it!
  - Maybe look at how these techniques can help your existing research



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- Surviving Failures

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- Battery Use Profiling
- Mobile Privilege Protection/Reduction
- Reproducing Remote Bugs
- ...

# What Could We Look At?

- Surviving Failures
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- Identifying Remote
- Automating Remote
- Automating Remote
- Automated Regression Testing
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- Data Race Explanation
- Battery Use Profiling
- Mobile Privilege Protection/Reduction

• I have planned out a survey, but we can customize it for interest

• The last few weeks will be chosen by your interests already

# Program Representations

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  - Compiled binaries
    - Difficult to even separate code from data in general
  - Source code
    - Very language specific



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- Difficult models:
  - Compiled binaries
    - Difficult to even separate code from data in general
  - Source code
    - Very language specific
- Need something better

# Program Representation

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

Core Representations for Analysis:

- 1) Abstract Syntax Trees
- 2) Control Flow Graphs
- 3) Program Dependence Graphs
- 4) Call Graphs
- 5) Points-to Graphs

# 1) Abstract Syntax Trees

- Lifts the source into a canonical semantic form
  - Internal nodes are operators, statements, etc.
  - Leaves are values, variables, operands



```
for i in range(5,10):  
    a[i] = i * 5
```



## 2) Control Flow Graphs

- Express the possible decisions and possible paths through a program



```
cond = input()
if cond:
    a = foo()
else:
    a = bar()
print(a)
```



## 2) Control Flow Graphs

- Express the possible decisions and possible paths through a program
  - Basic Blocks** (Nodes) are straight line code



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## 2) Control Flow Graphs

- Express the possible decisions and possible paths through a program
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  - **Edges** show how decisions can lead to different basic blocks


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## 2) Control Flow Graphs

- Express the possible decisions and possible paths through a program
  - **Basic Blocks** (Nodes) are straight line code
  - **Edges** show how decisions can lead to different basic blocks
  - **Paths** through the graph are potential paths through the program

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if cond:
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else:
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```





## 2) Control Flow Graphs (CFGs)

- Language specific features are often abstracted away

The 'while' is gone


```
sum = 0
i = 1
while 1 < N:
    i = i + 1
    sum = sum + i
print(sum)
```





## 2) Control Flow Graphs (CFGs)

- Language specific features are often abstracted away



### 3) Program Dependence Graph (PDG)

- Instruction  $X$  **depends** on  $Y$  if  $Y$  *can influence*  $X$ 
  - Nodes are instructions
  - An edge  $Y \rightarrow X$  shows that  $Y$  influences  $X$


### 3) Program Dependence Graph (PDG)

- Instruction X **depends** on Y if Y *can influence* X
  - Nodes are instructions
  - An edge  $Y \rightarrow X$  shows that Y influences X
- 2 main types of influence:
  - Data dependence
  - Control dependence

# Data Dependence

X data depends on Y if

- There exists a path from Y to X in the CFG
- A variable/value definition at Y is used at X



# Control Dependence

---

Preliminary: X **dominates** Y if

- every path from the **entry node to Y** passes X
  - strict, normal, & immediate dominance


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6) print(sum)
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
$\text{DOM}(6) = \{1, 2, 3, 6\}$     $\text{IDOM}(6) = 3$



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
# Control Dependence

Preliminary: X **post dominates** Y if

- every path from the **Y to exit** passes X
  - strict, normal, & immediate dominance

```
1) sum = 0
2) i = 1
3) while 1 < N:
4)   i = i + 1
5)   sum = sum + i
6) print(sum)
```

$\text{PDOM}(5)=\{3,5,6\}$     $\text{IPDOM}(5)=3$





# Control Dependence (Finally)

Y is control dependent on X iff

- Definition 1:

X directly decides whether Y executes

# Control Dependence (Finally)


Y is control dependent on X iff

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- Definition 2:


- There exists a path from X to Y s.t. Y post dominates every node between X and Y.
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
What is CD(5)? CD(3)

# Control Dependence

- There exists a path from X to Y s.t. Y post dominates every node between X and Y.
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```
1) sum = 0
2) i = 1
3) while 1 < N:
4)   i = i + 1
5)   if 0 == i%2:
6)     continue
7)   sum = sum + i
8) print(sum)
```

What is CD(7)?



# Control Dependence

- There exists a path from X to Y s.t. Y post dominates every node between X and Y.
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```
1) if X or Y:  
2)   print(X)  
3) print(Y)
```


What is CD(2)?

# Control Dependence

- There exists a path from X to Y s.t. Y post dominates every node between X and Y.
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```

What is CD(2)?



### 3)Program Dependence Graph(PDG)

The PDG is the combination of

- The control dependence graph
- The data dependence graph

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The PDG is the combination of

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Recall: Edges identify *potential influence*


- Debugging: What may have caused a bug?
- Security: Can sensitive information leak?
- Testing: How can I reach a statement?
- ...



## 4) Call Graph (Multigraph)

- Captures the **composition** of a program
  - Nodes are functions
  - Edges show possible calls

How should we handle  
function pointers?



## 5) Points-to Graphs

---

Aliasing:

- Multiple variables may denote the same memory location

Multiple Targets:

- One variable may potentially denote several different targets in memory.

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
```
x.lock()  
...  
y.unlock()
```

```
x = password  
...  
broadcast(y)
```

## 5) Points-to Graphs

- The relation  $(p, x)$  where  $p$  MAY/MUST point to  $x$ 
  - Both MAY and MUST information can be useful


```
1) r = C()  
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
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
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
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




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



$p.f.f$  MUST ALIAS  $t$   
 $q$  MAY ALIAS  $p$

# Execution Representations

- Program Representations are *static*
  - All possible program behaviors at once
  - Usually projected onto the CFG
- Execution Representations are *dynamic*
  - Only the behavior of a single real execution
  - Multiple instances of an instruction occur multiple times



# Control Flow Trace





$1_1 \ 2_1 \ 3_1 \ 4_1 \ 5_1 \ 3_2 \ 4_2 \ 5_2 \ 3_3 \ 6_1$   
 $1_1 \ 3_1 \ 4_1 \ 3_2 \ 4_2 \ 3_3 \ 6_1$   
TTF

All Equivalent



# Dynamic Dependence Graph





# Dynamic Dependence Graph



# Dynamic Dependence Graph



# Dynamic Dependence Graph



Notably a bit difficult for a human to wade through.

# Program Representations

---

Given these models, we can start to discuss interesting transformations and analyses on real programs.

Such as...



# Slicing

# Program Slicing

---

- The *slice* of a value  $v$  at a statement  $s$  is:
  - the set of statements involved in computing  $v$ 's value at  $s$ . [Weiser 82]

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1) sum = 0
2) i = 1
3) while 1 < N:
4)     i = i + 1
5)     sum = sum + i
6) print(sum)
7) print(i)
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# Program Slicing

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- The *slice* of a value *v* at a statement *s* is:
  - the set of statements involved in computing *v*'s value at *s*. [Weiser 82]
- The statements that may influence *v*...
  - Data dependence
  - Control dependence
  - Compute using the PDG!

# Program Slicing Uses

---

- Debugging
- Testing
- Reverse Engineering
- Optimization
- Design Profiling
- Malware analysis
- ...

# How to Slice?


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  - Start from  $v$  and just follow edges backward

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




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
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
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
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
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# How to Slice?

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# Very Configurable

---

- Static vs. Dynamic (PDG vs. DDG)
- Backward vs. Forward
- Executable vs. Nonexecutable

What do forward and backward *mean*?


Why might a slice not be executable?

# Strengths of Static Slicing

- Considers all possible executions
  - Necessary for conservative analyses
  - (“Might I leak secret information?”)
- Fast to compute
- Space efficient

# Issues with Static Slicing


- Multiple program paths






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


- Pointers – points-to graphs are imprecise




# Issues with Static Slicing

- Multiple program paths



- Pointers – points-to graphs are imprecise



- Function pointers – must consider all possible call targets

# Strengths of Dynamic Slicing

- Precisely considers a single execution (DDG)
  - “Did I ...”
- No imprecision from aliasing or multiple paths
  - Why?
- Cover fewer static program statements

# Issues with Dynamic Slicing

- Capturing a trace and computing a DDG is expensive
  - (GB sized trace files)
- Slow to compute
  - Churn a great deal of memory
- Very many **statement instances** and dynamic dependences to examine
- Misses alternative histories
  - What would have happened if ... ?

# Coping with Scale

---

Both types of slicing benefit from techniques that *prune* or *focus* slices on just what is *interesting*

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Both types of slicing benefit from techniques that *prune* or *focus* slices on just what is *interesting*

- *Thin Slicing*- Focus on propagating *v*, ignoring data structures [PLDI07]
- *Chopping*- Combine forward & backward info [ASE05]
- *Confidence Analysis*- Instructions used to compute correct values less likely to be buggy [PLDI06]
- *Guided Browsers*- Zoom in on demand [ICSE06]
- Much more...

# Static Analysis

# Static Analysis

---

Static analyses consider **all possible behaviors** of a program **without running** it.

- Look for a property of interest
  - Do I dereference NULL pointers?
  - Do I leak memory?
  - Do I violate a protocol specification?
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- Only if answers must be perfect.

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
- **Sound analyses**
  - Overapproximate
  - Guaranteed to find violations of property
  - May raise false alarms
- **Complete analyses**
  - Underapproximate
  - Reported violations are real
  - May miss violations

Striking the right balance is key to a useful analysis

# Static Analysis

---

Modeled program behaviors



# A Simple Example

---

Q: Is a particular number ever negative?

- Might be an offset into invalid memory!

Approximate the problem

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- **Concrete** domain: integers
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# A Simple Example

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Approximate the problem

- **Concrete** domain: integers
- **Abstract** domain:  $\{-, 0, +\} \cup \{\top, \perp\}$

concrete(x) = 5  $\rightarrow$  abstract(x) = +

concrete(y) = -3  $\rightarrow$  abstract(y) = -

concrete(z) = 0  $\rightarrow$  abstract(z) = 0

Combines sets of the concrete domain

# A Simple Example

- **Transfer Functions** show how to evaluate this approximated program:
  - $+$   $+$   $+$   $\rightarrow$   $+$
  - $-$   $+$   $-$   $\rightarrow$   $-$
  - $0$   $+$   $0$   $\rightarrow$   $0$
  - $0$   $+$   $-$   $\rightarrow$   $-$
  - ...
  - $+$   $+$   $-$   $\rightarrow$   $T$  (unknown)
  - $\dots / 0 \rightarrow \perp$  (undefined)

# A Simple Example

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  - $- + - \rightarrow -$
  - $0 + 0 \rightarrow 0$
  - $0 + - \rightarrow -$
  - ...
  - $+ + - \rightarrow \textcolor{red}{T}$  (unknown)
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- Can be subtle.
  - The above is not sound or complete. Why?

# A Simple Example

- **Transfer Functions** show how to evaluate this approximated program:

–  $++ \rightarrow +$

–  $-+ \rightarrow -$

–  $0+ \rightarrow 0$

–  $0+ \rightarrow -$

– ...

–  $++ \rightarrow \mathbf{T}$  (unknown)

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Consider a divide by 0 analysis.  
What are:

True Positives

False Positives

True Negatives


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
- Now model the abstract program state and propagate through the CFG.



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
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
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




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
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Will it always terminate?

# Data Flow Analysis


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
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  - $\{-,0,+\} \cup \{\top,\perp\}$
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Why is this enough?

# Data Flow Analysis

---

- Note: need to model program state at each statement
- Proper ordering & a work list algorithm improves the efficiency



# Static Analysis

---

- We've already seen a few static analyses:
  - Call graph construction
  - Points-to graph construction (What are MAY/MUST?)
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# Static Analysis

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- We've already seen a few static analyses:
  - Call graph construction
  - Points-to graph construction (What are MAY/MUST?)
  - Static slicing
- The choices for approximation are why these analyses are imprecise.

# Flow Insensitive Analysis

- Saw *flow sensitive* analysis
  - Modeling state at each statement is expensive
  - Scales to functions and small components
  - Usually not beyond 1000s of lines

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- Saw *flow sensitive* analysis
  - Modeling state at each statement is expensive
  - Scales to functions and small components
  - Usually not beyond 1000s of lines
- *Flow insensitive* analyses aggregate into a global state
  - Better scalability
  - Less precision
  - “Does this function modify global variable X?”

# Context Sensitive Analyses

- Program behavior may be dependent on the call stack / **calling context**.
  - “If bar() is called by foo(), then it is exception free.”
  - Can enable more precise *interprocedural* analyses

# Static Analysis

---

- We'll cover this further as necessary during the semester

# Project 1 & LLVM

Next Week:  
Dynamic Analysis,  
Profiling,  
Testing,  
Concurrency  
Security