CMPT 473 Software Testing, Reliability and Security

Model Checking

Nick Sumner wsumner@sfu.ca

Most techniques have limited claims

- Most techniques have limited claims
 - Testing
 - Show the program can behave correctly
 - Provide confidence for given criteria

- Most techniques have limited claims
 - Testing
 - Show the program can behave correctly
 - Provide confidence for given criteria
 - Dynamic Analysis
 - Helps find bugs
 - Collect information about programs

- Most techniques have limited claims
 - Testing
 - Show the program can behave correctly
 - Provide confidence for given criteria
 - Dynamic Analysis
 - Helps find bugs
 - Collect information about programs
 - Code Review
 - Finds many surface level issues

- Most techniques have limited claims
 - Testing
 - Show the program can behave correctly
 - Provide confidence for given criteria
 - Dynamic Analysis
 - Helps find bugs
 - Collect information about programs
 - Code Review
 - Finds many surface level issues
- Programs may exhibit subtle, hard to identify issues
 - Distributed file system integrity
 - Coordinating telephony

- Most techniques have limited claims
 - Testing
 - Show the program can behave correctly
 - Provide confidence for given criteria
 - Dynamic Analysis
 - Helps find bugs
 - Collect information about programs
 - Code Review
 - Finds many surface level issues
- Programs may exhibit subtle, hard to identify issues
 - Distributed file system integrity
 - Coordinating telephony
- But what if these components are mission critical?!

 If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth proving that the property holds

- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth proving that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools

- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth proving that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off

- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth *proving* that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off
- What kinds of properties would be interesting?


- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth proving that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off
- What kinds of properties would be interesting?
 - Safety Something bad never happens


- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth *proving* that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off
- What kinds of properties would be interesting?
 - Safety Something bad never happens
 - Liveness Something good eventually happens


- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth *proving* that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off
- What kinds of properties would be interesting?
 - Safety Something bad never happens
 - Liveness Something good eventually happens


Some things should always be true (invariants), while others should eventually be true.


- If a particular property is mission critical, it may be worth *proving* that the property holds
 - This often has a higher cost than applying other tools
 - The ROI for mission critical infrastructure can pay off
- What kinds of properties would be interesting?
 - Safety Something bad never happens
 - Liveness Something good eventually happens
 Some things should always be true (invariants), while others should eventually be true.
- Model checking is one such tool for proving these properties

















- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...

- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions

- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)

Start

Close


Heat

Error


- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)

- Start - Close - Heat - Error


- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)




- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)




- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)




- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions
 - (Oven example from Edmund Clarke)



- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions



- Often written in a formal specification language
 - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ...
- Need to express the finite states & transitions



 Often written in a formal specification language - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ... Need to express the finite states & transitions Start (Oven example from Edmund Clarke) Close Heat **Error** - Start Start - Start Close - Close - Close Heat - Heat - Heat - Error **Error** - Error **Start** Close Heat - Error **Start** - Start **Start** Close Close Close - Heat - Heat - Heat **Error** ¬ Error

- Error

 Often written in a formal specification language - temporal logic (CTL, LTL), Alloy, TLA, ... Need to express the finite states & transitions Start (Oven example from Edmund Clarke) Close Heat **Error** - Start Start - Start Close - Close - Close Heat - Heat - Heat - Error **Error** - Error **Start** Close Heat - Error **Start** - Start **Start** Close Close Close - Heat - Heat - Heat **Error** ¬ Error - Error

How can we specify properties?

Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed
- Temporal constraints for a proposition p:

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed
- Temporal constraints for a proposition p:
 - p will hold eventually in the future

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed
- Temporal constraints for a proposition p:
 - p will hold eventually in the future
 - p holds in all future states


- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed
- Temporal constraints for a proposition p:
 - p will hold eventually in the future
 - p holds in all future states
 - p holds in the next state

- Often in the same language, inspired by temporal logic
- Temporal constraints help express properties particularly interesting to concurrent and distributed systems
 - e.g. The oven doesn't heat up until the door is closed
- Temporal constraints for a proposition p:
 - p will hold eventually in the future
 - p holds in all future states
 - p holds in the next state
 - p holds until another proposition q holds

 Traffic lights are a common application of safety critical embedded systems

• Traffic lights are a common application of safety


critical embedded systems



Traffic lights are a common application of safety


critical embedded systems

• Interesting properties?



 Traffic lights are a common application of safety critical embedded systems

- Interesting properties
 - The light is green infinitely often




 Traffic lights are a common application of safety critical embedded systems

Interesting properties

- The light is green infinitely often
- A red light does not immediately become green

– ...



 Traffic lights are a common application of safety critical embedded systems

Red

Green

Yellow

Waiting

Interesting properties

- The light is green infinitely often
- A red light does not immediately become green

-

 You can also specify lights at an intersection as a distributed system & check the consistency!

Do people actually use it?

- Aerospace
- Hardware
- Critical infrastructure providers (including Amazon)
- Microsoft holds internal (& external) lectures on it

Do people actually use it?

- Aerospace
- Hardware
- Critical infrastructure providers (including Amazon)
- Microsoft holds internal (& external) lectures on it

Amazon's experience (Using TLA+)

- Now used by several teams within AWS
- Each system has a 1-2KLOC TLA+ specification
- Detected several internal issues before they struck

Do people actually use it?

- Aerospace
- Hardware
- Critical infrastructure providers (including Amazon)
- Microsoft holds internal (& external) lectures on it

Amazon's experience (Using TLA+)

- Now used by several teams within AWS
- Each system has a 1-2KLOC TLA+ specification
- Detected several internal issues before they struck

It is increasingly desirable for platform providers

What does TLA+ look like?

• Let's walk through an example...

Summary

 Model checking can be an excellent way of proving properties about programs.

Summary

- Model checking can be an excellent way of proving properties about programs.
- While it requires more effort and cost, it can prevent critical issues.

Summary

- Model checking can be an excellent way of proving properties about programs.
- While it requires more effort and cost, it can prevent critical issues.
- One such platform for model checking is TLA+.